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- Source states that Jamil Hardam first suggested to General Zaim that the latter might one day be instrumental in forming a "new Syria" which would be under some sort of dictatorship based on military strength, and which would give Zaim an important position in the government. Hardam, although not a special friend of his, felt that Zatim was the only person who could be used to challenge the power of their mutual energy Ahmad Sharabati, then Hinister of Defense. Because of this, Hardan protected Zalim when Sharabati desired to court-martial him for going to Damascus without permission, while he was in command of troops at Deir-ez-Zor. Mardam asked President Quawatli to be lenient with Za'im, and suggested that, if he really thought Za'im would cause trouble (as Sharabati insisted), he should remove him from his command at Deir-ez-Zor and place him in charge of the Sureté, which at that time (early 1948) was not a position of importance,
- Za'im, however, did not feel himself under obligation to Hardam for his intervention, as he felt that Mardam's acts were wholly a part of his political intrigues. When the Mardan Government fell in December 1948 and Hardam left for Cairo, Za'im remarked that it was "good riddance," source states.
- 3. When the Syrian coup detat took place in Harch 1949, Hardan cabled his congratulations from Gairo, but Za'im, reading the cable aloud to his entourage, stated, according to source, that it was too bad that Hardem was not in Damascus "to enjoy the honor of being the first to be hanged for betraying and cheating his country during the Palestine crisis."

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